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Abstract
After about three years following the end of its first civil war in 1996,
Liberia was again plunged into another civil war, when the Liberian
United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), a group of rebels,
attacked the country from neighbouring Guinea. The efforts by the Tay-
lor regime to repel the attack occasioned a full-scale war. Initially, the
war was confined to the western and north-western portions of the country.
But, by early 2003, LURD’s forces had advanced to the outskirts of
Monrovia, the capital city.
For the initial four years of the war, the United States displayed a non-
chalant attitude. This was because Liberia was no longer of any strategic
value to the US. Also, given the adversarial relationship between the
Taylor regime and Washington, the latter thus had no empathy for the
former. However, amid the escalation of the war and its attendant ad-
verse consequences, especially the death of hundreds of civilians,
ECOWAS, the AU, the EU, the UN and various actors within the American
domestic setting, including Liberian Diaspora Groups, pressured the
Bush administration to join the efforts to end the carnage. Consequently,
the Bush administration obliged. After an ECOWAS-brokered agree-
ment that led to the resignation of President Taylor and his subsequent
departure to Nigeria in exile, the United States intervened by supporting
ECOWAS’ peacekeeping operation.
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Against this backdrop, this article has interrelated purposes. First, it exa-
mines the nature and dynamics of American intervention in the second
Liberian civil war. Second, it discusses the impact of the American inter-
vention on the civil war. Third, it maps out the emerging trajectory of US–
Liberia relations in the post-Taylor era. Fourth, it proffers ways of rethinking
the relationship so that it would be mutually beneficial.
Résumé
Environ trois ans après la fin de sa première guerre civile en 1996, le
Liberia a été de nouveau plongé dans une autre guerre civile, lorsqu’un
groupe de rebelles, les Libériens unis pour la réconciliation et la démo-
cratie (Liberian United for Reconciliation and Democracy – LURD), a atta-
qué le pays à partir de la Guinée voisine. Les efforts du régime de Taylor
pour repousser l’attaque ont entraîné une guerre totale. Celle-ci était
confinée au départ aux régions ouest et nord-ouest du pays, mais au
début de l’année 2003, les forces de LURD avaient progressé jusqu’aux
abords de Monrovia, la capitale.
Pendant les quatre premières années de guerre, les Etats-Unis ont affi-
ché une attitude nonchalante, car le Liberia n’avait plus aucune valeur
stratégique pour eux. En outre, compte tenu des relations conflictuelles
entre le régime de Taylor et Washington, ces derniers n’avaient aucune
empathie pour le premier. Cependant, face à l’escalade de la guerre et
des conséquences négatives qui en découlent, en particulier la mort de
centaines de civils, la CEDEAO, l’Union africaine, l’Union européenne,
les Nations Unies et divers acteurs à l’intérieur des Etats-Unis, y compris
des Groupes de la diaspora libérienne, ont mis la pression sur l’adminis-
tration Bush afin qu’elle se joigne aux efforts pour mettre fin au carnage.
Ce qu’elle accepta donc. A la suite d’un accord négocié sous l’égide de
la CEDEAO qui a abouti à la démission du Président Taylor et son départ
subséquent en exil au Nigeria, les Etats-Unis sont intervenus en soute-
nant l’opération de maintien de la paix de la CEDEAO.
Dans ce contexte, le présent article a des objectifs étroitement liés : un,
examiner la nature et la dynamique de l’intervention américaine dans la
seconde guerre civile libérienne ; deux, discuter de l’impact de l’inter-
vention américaine sur la guerre civile ; trois, dresser la carte de la tra-
jectoire émergente des relations entre les Etats-Unis et le Liberia après
l’ère Taylor ; et quatre, offrir des moyens de repenser les relations pour
qu’elles soient mutuellement bénéfiques.
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Introduction
For almost four years, the United States demonstrated nonchalance in its
foreign policy behaviour toward the second Liberian civil war. Several factors
accounted for this. First, with the end of the ‘Cold War,’ Liberia was no longer
of strategic importance. Second, given the hostile relations between the United
States and Liberia during the Taylor regime, Washington therefore saw the
insurgency launched by the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy
(LURD), an amalgam of former leaders and members of the various warring
factions from Liberia’s first civil war (1989-1997), as an opportunity to oust
the Taylor regime from power. Toward this end, despite its foreign policy
behaviour, the United States acquiesced in the transfer of its weapons from
Guinea (LURD’s sub-regional patron) to LURD (Coalition to Stop the use of
Child Soldiers, 2004). The weapons were then used by LURD’s forces to
wage the war and the campaign to oust the Taylor regime from power. Third,
the theatre of the war was limited to the western and north-western regions of
Liberia from early 1999, when the war commenced, to early 2003. Thus, the
horrendous human rights violations (Human Rights Watch 1999; Human Rights
Watch 2000; Human Rights Watch 2001; Human Rights Watch 2002) that
were committed by the belligerents – Taylor’s government forces and those of
LURD – were not publicly known. Thus, there was no public outcry at that time
for intervention by the United States and other global actors.
However, by March 2003, the theatre of the war expanded to the outskirts
of the capital city, Monrovia. The resultant ‘tugs and pulls’ between govern-
ment and LURD forces witnessed an escalation of the violence, as hundreds
of civilians were wounded and killed by both targeted and indiscriminate at-
tacks from the warring parties. With the war and its associated unmitigated
violence within full view, there were calls from various quarters for the interna-
tional community to intervene and halt the orgy of violence that had engulfed
the entire country with the emergence of the Movement for Democracy in
Liberia (MODEL), an offshoot of LURD, as the so-called ‘second’ insurgent
group. As Liberia’s neo-colonial patron, the United States came under an
avalanche of pressure from the European Union, the African Union, the Eco-
nomic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and various Liberian
Diaspora groups based in the United States to intervene in the war.  Ulti-
mately, the United States shifted its policy from nonchalance to engagement
in the second Liberian civil war.
Against this background, the article has several interrelated purposes. First,
it will examine the nature and dynamics of the United States’ engagement in
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the second Liberian civil war. Second, the study will assess the impact of the
American engagement in the war. Third, the article will probe the state of US–
Liberia relations in the post-Taylor era. Fourth, it will suggest ways for rethink-
ing US–Liberia relations as a strategy for helping to forestall the re-occurrence
of war in Liberia.
The Stabilization Support Model
The study uses the stabilisation support model as its theoretical framework for
describing and explaining the thrust of the United States’ engagement in the
second Liberian civil war. The model is anchored on several pillars. First,
stabilisation support takes place in the context of armed violence. And the
violence serves as a barrier to the delivery of humanitarian relief and peace-
making.
Second, stabilisation support entails the indirect participation of an actor in
the efforts to terminate a war by supporting the military intervention of another
actor. The support usually takes the form of assistance with training, planning,
the transporting of troops, and the provision of equipment, logistics and intel-
ligence. Importantly, the ‘supporting actor’ may use its military forces as the
conduits for aiding the ‘engaged actor’.
Third, the ‘supporting actor’ collaborates with the ‘engaged actor’ in the
identification of the sources of the violence that undergirds the war. Subse-
quently, the former helps the latter in bringing the intervention assets to bear
on halting the violence, and stabilising the environment. In turn, this creates
the conditions for the distribution of humanitarian relief to civilians. Ultimately,
this helps to restore hope to, and comfort for the civilian population (Freed-
man 2007:248). Also, the mitigation of the violence and the stabilisation of
the environment provide propitious conditions for the undertaking of peace-
making efforts to resolve the war and its underlying conflict.
The Second Liberian Civil War
Background
Based on ECOWAS’ ‘exit strategy’, post-conflict election was hastily organ-
ised when the conditions were not propitious. The ‘exit strategy’ was informed
by intervention-fatigue. That is, the peacekeeping operation had exacted sub-
stantial human, financial and logistical costs on the participating West African
states, especially Nigeria that provided the majority of the troops and the funding
(Adebayo 2002). It is estimated that the peacekeeping operation cost Ni-
geria in excess of $500 million (Hutchful 1999). Against this background, the
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leaders of the sub-region led by President Sani Abacha of Nigeria made the
determination that the holding of election would be the best ‘exit strategy’
(Interviews 1998a and 1999).
ECOWAS’ ‘exit strategy’ adversely affected the electoral environment in
various ways. One major way was that the disarmament and demobilisation
phases, which were critical to what Lyons (2001:1) calls ‘the demilitarization
of politics’, were incomplete (Ballentine and Nitzschke 2005). By the time
these two phases ended on 7 February 1997, only 21,315 of the estimated
60,000 fighters had been disarmed (Human Rights 1998; Tanner 1998).
This worked to the advantage of the Taylor-led National Patriotic Party (NPP),
the political expression of the NPFL, the largest warring faction. With the
military and administrative machinery of the NPFL intact in the majority of
Liberia’s territory, the NPP had the machinery for waging the presidential cam-
paign through the use of intimidation and fear (Tanner 1998; Lyons 1999).
With the political space still militarised, voters were fearful that if they did not
support Taylor and the NPP, harm would either befall them personally or the
country as a whole (Lyons 1999; Lyons 2002). The fear was buttressed by
Taylor’s recurrent claim that if he did not win the Liberian Presidency, he
would revert to the waging of war (Lyons 1999).
Another advantage for the NPP was that the NPFL’s military machinery
was used to intimidate and make it difficult for the other presidential candi-
dates to campaign freely throughout the country (Lyons 1999; Lyons 2002).
Two cases are instructive. Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, the flag bearer of the Unity
Part (UP), was intimidated and harassed by NPFL operatives, while she cam-
paigned in Nimba County, the north central region of the country (Interviews
1998b). Similarly, NPFL militiamen obstructed H. Boima Fahnbulleh, the stand-
ard bearer of the Reformation Action Party (RAP), as he tried to campaign in
Grand Cape Mount County, his home region, in the western section of the
country (Interviews 1998b).
Additionally, Taylor had an overwhelming advantage over the other political
parties (mainly civilian-led) in the critical areas of financial and material re-
sources. Given the fact that Taylor used the war to plunder and pillage Libe-
ria’s rubber, diamond, gold and timber (Reno 1996), he had a huge ‘election
war chest,’ including money for vote-buying, a radio station, automobiles, t-
shirts, posters and other resources that far exceeded the combined resource
bases of all of the other political parties(Lyons 1998). Also, given ECOWAS’
plan to award Taylor the presidency, he was allowed to begin campaigning in
advance of the official commencement of the campaign season (Harris 1999).
Even though, this was clearly in contravention of the electoral code, Taylor was
never penalised.
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From ‘Democratic’ Elections to Failed Peacebuilding
With the ‘electoral playing field’ not levelled, and amid major security chal-
lenges, Liberians went to the polls en masse to choose its new president. To
the chagrin of some Liberians and observers of Liberian affairs, the overwhelming
majority of the electorate, for a variety of reasons, gave Taylor and his NPP a
landslide victory in the presidential election – over 75 per cent of the votes
(Independent Election Commission, 1997a). Based on the proportional rep-
resentation electoral formula, Taylor’s political party was allotted 21 out of 30
seats in the Senate, and 49 of the 64 seats in the House of Representatives
(Independent Election Commission 1997b). This meant that Taylor was in
complete control of the government.
Clearly, Taylor’s victory was a great disappointment to the Clinton admin-
istration, which despite its chequered involvement in peacemaking efforts,
showed considerable interest in the election. Specifically, the Clinton adminis-
tration was hopeful that Ellen Johnson Sirleaf (now the incumbent president),
a member of the ‘old local wing’ of the Liberian ruling class spanning the
Tubman (portion) and Tolbert regimes, would have won the election. As a
member of what Prado (1966) calls the ‘bureaucratic wing’ of the local ruling
class, Madam Sirleaf held several positions, including assistant minister of
finance, deputy minister of finance for expenditure and debt management,
minister of finance and President of the Liberian Bank for Development and
Investment(LBDI). As well, she held positions at Citibank in the United States,
the World Bank and the United Nations (Sirleaf 2009). The ‘old local wing’ of
the Liberian ruling class had a ‘patron-client relationship’ with the United States
and its ruling class (Lumumba-Kasongo 1999). Under this relationship, the
‘old local wing’ of the Liberian ruling class performed an assortment of func-
tions and services on behalf of the United States and its ruling class, including
creating propitious conditions for the accumulation of capital by American
multinational corporations like Firestone (Mayson and Sawyer 1979; Lumumba-
Kasongo 1999; Kieh 2007).
Having achieved his ambition of becoming the President of Liberia, the
hope was entertained by Liberians and various actors in the international com-
munity, including ECOWAS, the OAU (now the AU), the UN and the United
States, that Taylor would provide the requisite leadership for shepherding the
post-conflict peace building project, especially the exigency of addressing the
root causes of the first Liberian civil war. Unfortunately, the Taylor regime
undertook various actions that undermined the peace building project and even-
tually led to its failure. At the vortex, the Taylor regime refused to set into
motion measures for addressing the taproots of the first Liberian civil war. The
5-Kieh.pmd 28/09/2013, 16:55126
Kieh: United States Foreign Policy and the Second Liberian Civil War 127
overarching failure was the refusal to democratically reconstitute the neo-co-
lonial Liberian state, the generator of the crises of underdevelopment that
occasioned the war. To make matters worse, the performance of the Taylor
regime was horrendous. For example, the social and economic conditions of
the members of Liberia’s subaltern classes grew worse. By 1999, the poverty
rate was 76.2 per cent, and the unemployment rate stood at an alarming 85
per cent (United Nations Development Programme 2006). During the same
period, the Human Development Index (HDI) was 0.276, ranking the country
174th out of 175 countries worldwide (United Nations Development Programme
1999). Politically, Taylor reverted to authoritarianism as evidenced by, among
other things, the unmitigated violation of human rights (Freedom House 2010).
In the security realm, the Taylor regime reneged on its commitment to under-
take security sector reform as required by the Abuja II Peace Accord. Instead,
President Taylor transformed his militia into Liberia’s new military, security
and police apparatus (Lehtinen 2002). One of the major consequences was
the heightening of the sense of insecurity that had enveloped the leaders of
the various former militias, who were apprehensive about a Taylor presidency,
especially in terms of its impact on their security.
At the sub-regional level, President Taylor embarked upon a campaign of
destabilisation in the extended Mano River Basin of West Africa. At the core
was the continuation of his support for the Revolutionary United Front (RUF)
in Sierra Leone (Human Rights Watch 2006). Also, in Guinea, President
Taylor supported the Rally of Democratic Forces of Guinea (RFDG), a rebel
group, in its effort to depose the government of President Lasana Conte (Plough-
shares 2000). In Côte d’Ivoire, the Taylor regime provided military and other
support to the rebel outfit Movement for Peace and Justice (MPJ), which was
determined to overthrow the regime of President Laurent Gbagbo (Dukule
2002). Significantly, President Taylor’s sub-regional destabilisation project
was propelled by two major objectives: Taylor’s insatiable appetite for the
personal control of natural resources as the locus of his private accumulation
of capital project, and his penchant to become a sub-regional ‘power broker.’
     Clearly, President Taylor’s actions helped to fuel the antagonistic rela-
tionship between his regime and the United States government. Particularly,
the American government was incensed by Taylor’s destabilisation campaign,
especially in Sierra Leone and Guinea, whose regimes were friendly toward
the United States. Accordingly, the United States government pursued three
major sets of interrelated measures as the cornerstones of its relations with
Liberia. The locus was the political and diplomatic isolation of the Taylor re-
gime, although as Human Rights Watch (2002:2) aptly observes, ‘The U.S.
was less public in its approach.’ Another measure was the imposition of sanc-
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tions on the importation of Liberian rough diamonds (Human Rights Watch
2002:2). Washington also pursued a humanitarian assistance programme
through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID),
which focused on the resettlement of refugees and internally displaced per-
sons, and a modest but less successful democracy and governance programme
(Human Rights Watch 2002:2).
The Return to Warfare
Despite its efforts to construct a ‘garrison state,’ the Taylor regime was unable
to dragoon the Liberian people into supporting it. Hence, with the evaporation
of the euphoria and the resultant legitimacy which it enjoyed both prior to, and
immediately after the 1997 election, the Taylor regime became vulnerable to
insurgency. Accordingly, an amalgam of some of the leaders of the former
militias (Taylor’s adversaries), their supporters and some of Taylor’s disgrun-
tled supporters established LURD as an insurgency movement with the sole
goal of removing Taylor from power, and assuming control of the state. Then,
using Guinea as the ‘launching pad,’ LURD’s forces attacked the western and
northwestern portions of Liberia in 1999 (Brabazon 2003). In return, the
Taylor regime mobilised the full battery of its military assets and sought to
repel the attack. The resultant ‘tit for tat’ plunged the country into its second
civil war.
     As has been discussed, for almost four years, the war was focused in
the west and northwest regions of Liberia. It was not until mid-2003 that the
war progressed to the outskirts of the capital city region. This development
was helped in part by the decision of LURD to split into two groups: LURD, the
original militia, and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL). As Joe
Wylie, one of LURD’s military advisors boasted, ‘MODEL [was] an integrated
force of LURD’ (Global Security 2005a:1). The decision to create MODEL
was propelled by the determination that a two-front war would exert enormous
pressure on the Taylor regime, especially its demoralised military. Accordingly,
MODEL opened a ‘second front’ in the south and south-eastern regions of the
country, while LURD continued to focus on the west, north-western and capi-
tal city regions.
By May 2003, the Taylor regime had lost control over the entire country
with the exception of an enclave in Monrovia, the capital city, where Taylor and
the core of his fighters were ensconced. So, for about two months, the resi-
dents of the capital city region were subjected to attacks from LURD and the
Taylor regime. And this resulted in the injury and death of thousands of inno-
cent civilians (Clapham 2003). The escalation of the violence and the result-
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ant injuries and deaths eventually led to a humanitarian crisis. In turn, there
were calls from various quarters for the international community to intervene
and halt the carnage.
The Bush Administration and U.S. Policy Responses to the Second Civil War
The Phases of American Policy Responses
American policy toward the second civil war went through various phases spanning
the ‘wait and see’ to engagement through the stabilisation mission. In this
section of the article, the nature and dynamics of the various phases will be
examined.
The ‘Wait and See Phase’
The United States was cognizant of the deteriorating security conditions in
Liberia as a consequence of the outbreak of the latter’s second civil war, long
before the highly publicised siege of the capital city region by LURD in mid
2003. This was evidenced by various actions taken by the United States’
European Command (EUCOM), which then had responsibility for American
military and security activities in the African region. In early 2003, EUCOM
sent a survey and assessment team and a Naval SEAL platoon to Monrovia
(Ross 2005:1).
Few months later, with the security situation in Liberia deteriorating at a
fast pace, EUCOM increased the security at the US Embassy in Liberia with a
Fleet Anti-Terrorism Security Team Platoon (Ross 2005:1). Also, EUCOM
deployed a humanitarian and assistance survey team to determine the extent
of the humanitarian crisis (Ross 2005:1). Then, in late July 2003, EUCOM
pre-positioned the 398th Air Expeditionary Group in Freetown, Sierra Leone,
and Dakar, Senegal (Ross 2005:1). EUCOM also placed Special Operations
Forces (SOF) in neighbouring countries, in preparation for a possible non-
combatant evacuation of US citizens (Ross 2005:1). In late July 2003, a
Joint Task Force for Liberia was established. The force trained in case a mili-
tary operation in Liberia was ordered by the President of the United States.
The Nonchalance Phase
Despite being cognizant of the reign of violence and its associated conse-
quences of injuries and deaths in Liberia, the Bush administration decided that
the United States would not intervene militarily in the civil war. Two major
factors accounted for this. First, consistent with the United States’ realpolitik
foreign policy framework, Liberia was of no strategic value to the United States;
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hence, a military intervention and its attendant risks were unwarranted. As
Beinart (2003:1) laments, ‘In countries that lack oil and strategic location,
rescuing suffering people still falls into the Clintonian category of ‘foreign policy
as social work’.’ Second, the Bush administration was still suffering from what
has been referred to as the ‘Somalia overhang’ (Crocker 1995). This mindset,
which is based on the failed American-led peacekeeping mission in Somalia in
1992, militates against any American ‘armed humanitarianism’ in civil war
ravaged African countries that are enveloped by humanitarian crisis.
Accordingly, like the administration of ‘Bush 41’ did during the first Liberian
civil war in 1989, the regime of ‘Bush 43’ chose to watch the Liberian civil war
and its deleterious consequences. Thus, the US Joint Task Force Liberia, which
was organised in the case of an eventuality, was ordered to change its former
stance, since no American military intervention in the conflict was in the offing.
So, as the second Liberian civil war raged on, the United States took a non-
chalant attitude toward the conflict. In fact, as thousands of Liberians be-
sieged the US Embassy for help, the Marines stationed at the American Em-
bassy simply protected the facility (Beinart 2003:1). This attitude on the part
of the Bush administration disappointed many Liberians, who expected the
United States to intervene in their country’s civil war. To express their anger at
the Bush administration’s indifference, some people of Monrovia lined up bodies
of civilians killed during the fighting in front of the US Embassy (Cherin 2003:1).
The Engagement Phase
Riveted by an avalanche of domestic and international pressure amid the ‘kill-
ing fields’ in Liberia, the Bush administration finally decided to get involved in
the efforts to help end the civil war and its attendant human suffering. Several
factors contributed to the policy shift. Within the Bush administration, some
officials of the Department of State led by Secretary of State Colin Powell,
pressed the case for American involvement (Matthews 2003:1). Another fac-
tor was that several civil society groups in the United States pleaded for Ameri-
can intervention on humanitarian grounds. In making the case, the New York
Times (2003:A18) asserted, ‘Swift American intervention could help end two
decades of carnage that has destroyed Liberia and crippled several of its neigh-
bours. It can save lives, stabilise the region, and prove that America’s commit-
ment to Africa is real.’ As well, the Liberian Diaspora community pressed for
American intervention (Africa Focus 2003:1). At the global level, ECOWAS,
the AU, the EU and the UN exerted pressure on Washington (O’Connell 2004).
Yet, another major factor revolved around American security interests, es-
pecially against the backdrop of the post-9/11 international environment. In
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this vein, the United States is concerned about so-called ‘failed states’ being
used as ‘terrorist beachheads.’ In accentuating this point in the context of the
second Liberian civil war, Condolezza Rice, the then National Security Advisor
to President Bush noted,
The President does believe that Liberia and the stability of West Africa
[are] important to U.S. interest. In addition to the humanitarian situation
there, we’ve also recognized since 9/11 that one wants to be careful
about permitting conditions of failed states that could lead to greater sour-
ces of terrorism (Freeman 2003:1).
Specifically, President Taylor was accused of having ties to Al Qaeda. For
example, a confidential investigation by the Special Court for Sierra Leone
found that there were links between Taylor and Al Qaeda (Global Witness
2003; allAfrica.com 2004:1-2; O’Connell 2004). Similarly, according to Farah
and Shultz (2004:A19), ‘American security agencies like the FBI found that
Al Qaeda was involved in the diamond trade under the protection of President
Taylor.’ Against this background, ‘the U.S. was planning strikes against Al
Qaeda operations in Liberia, but the intervention was called off’ (allAfrica.com
2004:1-2).
However, the puzzle remained the instrument through which the United
States’ involvement would be channelled. Hence, several options were consid-
ered by the Bush administration, including American involvement in a multilat-
eral peacekeeping operation that would require deploying thousands of troops
(Steams 2003:1). With regards to the peacekeeping option, Bush adminis-
tration officials were divided over the risks of American involvement in such a
military operation (Steams 2003:1).
Ultimately, President Bush decided that the United States’ involvement in
helping to end the second Liberian civil war would be through the provision of
support for a stabilisation project undertaken by the Economic Community of
West African States (ECOWAS). Against this background, the Bush adminis-
tration’s ‘stabilization promotion strategy in Liberia’ was based on three inter-
locking tenets. First, ECOWAS would establish a peacekeeping force, and the
United States would provide financial, logistical, training and operational as-
sistance for the stabilisation mission. Second, prior to the ECOWAS peace-
keeping force’s intervention into the conflict, President Charles Taylor had to
resign and leave Liberia. The rationale was that this would help create a con-
ducive environment for both peacekeeping and peacemaking, especially the
termination of the war and the formulation of a peace building project embod-
ied in a peace settlement. Third, a ceasefire agreement needed to be negoti-
ated and implemented among the belligerents. This would then provide the
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requisite space within which the ECOWAS peacekeeping force would operate.
Subsequently, a stabilised environment would serve as the terra firma for the
intervention of a much larger United Nations peacekeeping force.
War Termination and Stabilisation Support Activities
The Bush administration undertook various steps to support efforts to termi-
nate the second Liberian civil war and stabilise the country. First, as a demon-
stration of American support for the stabilisation mission, three warships with
2,300 marines were initially deployed off the Liberian coast (Pham 2006:38).
Then, following President Taylor’s resignation, and subsequent departure from
Liberia for exile in Nigeria, the warships were brought in full view closer to the
Liberian coast. This was designed to show support for the stabilisation mis-
sion, and to send a signal to the belligerents that the United States was deter-
mined to help terminate the war, and stabilise Liberia (Lawson 2007).
     Second, the Bush administration helped to pressure President Taylor to
resign and leave Liberia. In framing his administration’s position on the mat-
ter, President Bush insisted, ‘President Taylor needs to step down so that his
country can be spared further bloodshed’ (Law 2008:1). Subsequently, Presi-
dent Bush and some of his senior foreign policy advisors recurrently urged
President Taylor to resign and leave Liberia. The resignation refrain made
President Taylor to believe that if he failed to comply, the United States would
use military force to oust him from power. President Taylor’s position was
informed by the widely held perception that the Bush administration did not
hesitate to use military force inducing compliance. As well, the leaders of
ECOWAS played a pivotal role in negotiating the agreement that led to Taylor’s
resignation as the President of Liberia on 11 August  2003, after the expira-
tion of his term of office, and his subsequent departure for Nigeria.
Third, the Bush administration collaborated with ECOWAS in the brokering
of a ceasefire agreement among Liberia’s warring parties. Consequently, a
formal ceasefire agreement was signed on 17 June 2003. The signing of the
ceasefire agreement provided the requisite space for the intervention of the
Economic Community of West African States’ Military Mission to Liberia
(ECOMIL), the sub-regional peacekeeping force. The Bush administration
had insisted that its support for the peacekeeping force and the broader war
termination and stabilisation project was contingent upon the signing of a
ceasefire agreement.
Fourth, the U.S. Joint Task Force Liberia (JTFL) provided assistance to
ECOMIL, the peacekeeping force, in the prosecution of the war termination
and stabilisation project. One critical area was the provision of assistance with
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troop readiness. Moreover, the JTFL assisted the peacekeeping force with the
deployment of its troops in the various strategic zones in Liberia’s capital city
region. Another was the provision of equipment and logistics. In the area of
intelligence, the JTFL assisted with the gathering of information on the secu-
rity situation, including the activities of the belligerents. The locus of the in-
telligence collection dimension was the conduct of daily aerial patrols over
Liberia by JTFL.
The Dividends of the United States’ War Termination and Stabilisation Activities
The various war termination and stabilisation activities undertaken by the United
States produced several benefits. First, President Taylor resigned, and left for
Nigeria. This helped removed one of the major obstacles to the termination of
the war. Both LURD and MODEL had recurrently insisted that the sine qua
non for the termination of the war was the resignation of President Taylor, and
his departure from the country.
Second, American assistance was pivotal to the deployment of ECOMIL,
the peacekeeping force, and the subsequent stabilisation activities. For exam-
ple, ECOMIL was able to secure Roberts International Airport and the Freeport
of Monrovia, two strategic assets. In turn, this helped to facilitate the flow of
humanitarian assistance from various countries and non-governmental organi-
sations. Similarly, the peacekeeping force established security corridors through
which food, medicine, clothing and other items were delivered to civilians,
especially in the capital city region. Additionally, the peacekeeping force re-
moved the forces of the warring factions that were occupying various locations
around the capital city region. Subsequently, the peacekeeping force estab-
lished various ‘buffer and security zones.’ The resultant effect was that the
various warring factions were confined to specific zones, especially in the capi-
tal city region. This enabled the peacekeeping force to monitor their activities
more effectively.
Third, the mayhem and the resultant humanitarian crisis were reduced,
particularly in the capital city area. However, the size of the peacekeeping
force (3,600 troops) militated against ECOMIL’s capacity to police the entire
country. Hence, the peacekeeping force was only able to effectively reduce the
rate of the wanton killing of civilians, and to halt the emergent humanitarian
crisis principally in the capital city region. Although the peacekeeping force
eventually extended its activities to various regions of Liberia that were closer
to the capital city, its limited size vis-a-vis the forces of the three warring
factions – the total size of the combined forces of the Liberian government,
LURD and MODEL was estimated at 40,000(Global Security 2005b).
5-Kieh.pmd 28/09/2013, 16:55133
134 AJIA, Volume 13, Numbers 1&2, 2010
Fourth, the stabilisation project helped to create propitious conditions for
the undertaking of the ‘Akosombo/Accra Peace Process,’ and the eventual
brokering of the ‘Accra Peace Accord’ or the ‘Comprehensive Peace Agreement
by ECOWAS. The agreement, among other things, embodied the ceasefire
agreement signed on 17 June 2003, the modalities for the termination of the
war, the composition, mandate and term of office of the interim government,
and some of the major rubrics for post-conflict peace building. The subsequent
signing and promulgation of the peace accord fundamentally altered the secu-
rity environment in Liberia by shifting from war to post-conflict peace building.
Fifth, the stabilisation activities were central to the creation of an enabling
security environment for the deployment of the United Nations Peacekeeping
Force. That is, with American assistance, ECOMIL was able to create the
requisite space for the UN peacekeeping force to assume the security func-
tions in Liberia. Also, ECOMIL, drawing from the lessons of its intervention,
was able to provide the UN peacekeeping force with valuable information cov-
ering a broad range of issues. Clearly, this has been critical to the success of
the UN peacekeeping force over the past five years.
US–Liberia Relations during the Post-Taylor Era
Taylor’s Resignation and Departure to, and Arrest in Nigeria
As earlier discussed, ECOWAS brokered an agreement that led to the resigna-
tion of President Taylor (BBC News 2003). Although Taylor’s term of office
expired on 2 August  2003, under the Liberian Constitution, he would have
remained in office until January 2004, when the new president was sworn in
(Constitution of Liberia 1986). Taylor resigned on 11 August  2003, and
departed for Nigeria, where he was granted political asylum (BBC News 2003).
The locus of the plan, according to Femi Fani-Kayode, the Presidential Spokes-
person for former President Obasanjo, was that ‘Taylor reached an agreement
with the African Union (AU) and ECOWAS to trade prosecution at the hybrid
court in Sierra Leone for exile in Nigeria’(The Analyst 2010:1). Vice President
Moses Blah was sworn in as President on 11 August 2003. Under the terms of
the ECOWAS brokered agreement, Blah served until 14 October 2003, when
the National Transitional Government of Liberia headed by Gyude Bryant
assumed power.
Interestingly, on 29 March 2006, Taylor was arrested by the Nigerian
Police in the State of Borno on the border with Cameroon (Associated Press
2006; Reuters 2006). There are several explanations for Taylor’s arrest.
One of them is that the United States pressured President Ellen Johnson
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Sirleaf, the new Liberian chief executive, to request that Nigeria revokes Taylor’s
asylum status and return him to Liberia, so he could be sent to the Special
Court for Sierra Leone to face trial for war crime charges (The Analyst 2010).
The related point is that during a state visit to the United States in March
2006, President Bush ‘refused to see [President Obasanjo] until Taylor was
produced’ (The Analyst 2010).
On 29 March  2006, Nigeria returned Taylor to Liberia. After a very brief
stay, on the same day, Liberia sent Taylor to Sierra Leone to face war crime
charges at the Special Court for Sierra Leone for his alleged involvement in the
Sierra Leonean civil war (Soares 2006). About a month later, Taylor was sent
to the Hague, Netherlands to stand trails at the Special Court for Sierra Leone,
which was moved from Freetown (Afro News 2006). Taylor’s trail commenced
in the Hague in January 2007 (The Guardian 2009).
The Transitional Period
The end of the Taylor regime occasioned a shift in US–Liberia relations from
a state of hostility back to the traditional amity. During the Taylor regime
(1997-2003), an adversarial relationship developed between the two coun-
tries (US State Department 2010). From the American perspective, the situ-
ation was caused by the confluence of three major factors: 1) Taylor did not
improve the lives of Liberians (US State Department 2010); 2) Taylor
supported the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), the insurgency group, to
destabilise Sierra Leone (US State Department 2010); and 3) Taylor’s
misrule led to the second Liberian civil war (US State Department 2010).
Accordingly, the US cut direct financial and military aid to Liberia, imposed
a travel ban prohibiting Taylor and his senior officials from visiting the United
States, and recurrently criticised the Taylor regime for human rights violations
(US State Department 2010). With one exception – the charge that Taylor
supported the RUF –, all of the US’ client regimes in Liberia – Tubman (1944-
1971), Tolbert (1971-1980), and Doe (1980-1990) – neglected the needs
of the subaltern classes in Liberia as well. And overtime, this created the con-
tradictions and crises that led to the first Liberian civil war in 1989. Without
holding brief for Taylor, the point is that the welfare of ordinary Liberians has
never been a concern of US foreign policy toward the country. If this were
the case, then the US should not have supported its aforementioned client
regimes.
Against this backdrop, an assessment of some of the claims that Taylor
has made at his war crimes trial indicate that the ruptured cordial relationship
between Taylor and the United States prior to, and during, the first Liberian
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civil war could be the critical causative factor for the development of hostile
relations between the United States and Liberia during the Taylor presidency.
It seems that Taylor may have ‘double-crossed the United States’ at some
point. In this vein, two important assertions by Taylor are noteworthy. First,
Taylor claims that the US government freed him from prison in 1985, while he
was awaiting extradition to Liberia on embezzlement charges (Keating 2009:1).
Second, according to Taylor, during the first Liberian civil war, ‘The NPFL [his
militia] provided information to the CIA… And there was information from the
CIA to the [NPFL]’ (Sesay 2010:1). In addition, Taylor asserts that the CIA
provided sophisticated communications equipment to the NPFL (Sesay
2010:1). As I have argued, it appears that there were factors related to the
‘US-Taylor relationship’ that shifted the tenor of the relationship from friend-
ship to enmity, beyond the official American government position.
The National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL)
During the tenure of the National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL),
US–Liberia relations returned to its normal complexion based on friendship
and cordiality. Two clusters of actions that were undertaken by the United
States demonstrated the return to normalcy. The US supported the United
Nations Mission in Liberia, as it undertook various peace building activities.
At the bilateral level, from 2004-2006, the United States contributed over
US$1 billion to the reconstruction of Liberia (US State Department 2010). As
well, both the National Democratic and National Republican Institutes played
pivotal roles in the development of the modalities for holding Liberia’s second
post-conflict elections in October and November 2005. In addition, the United
State Agency for International Development commissioned, as well as under-
took various studies on economic, political and social issues in Liberia.
The Sirleaf Regime
The election and subsequent inauguration of Ellen Johnson Sirleaf as the new
President of Liberia on 16 January 2006, witnessed the resurgence of in-
creased American involvement in Liberia. The process was set into motion by
then First Lady Laura Bush and then Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice
attending President Sirleaf’s inauguration as official representatives of the United
States government. About three months after her inauguration, President Sirleaf
was invited to the United States to meet with then President Bush and to
address a joint session of the United States’ Congress (allAfrica.com 2006).
In November 2007, President Bush awarded President Sirleaf ‘The Presiden-
tial Medal of Freedom,’ the United States’ highest civilian award (Executive
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Mansion 2007). In February 2008, President Bush visited Liberia during his
second tour of selected African states (US State Department 2010). As well,
Liberia is currently the second largest recipient of US bilateral development aid
in Africa (US State Department 2010). Under the Obama administration, the
cordial relationship between the two countries has continued. For example,
Secretary of State Hilary Clinton has visited Liberia, and held several other
meetings with President Sirleaf. Similarly, President Obama met with Presi-
dent Sirleaf at the White House on 27 March 2010.
In appreciation for the unprecedented American support for her regime,
President Sirleaf, amid widespread opposition from her fellow African leaders,
mounted a ‘full court press’ in strongly supporting and defending the estab-
lishment of AFRICOM, the US African Command, and offered to host the
command’s headquarters in Liberia (Nhamoyebonde 2010). Moreover, the
Sirleaf regime has been courting American businesses to invest in Liberia un-
der very generous investment terms, including the right to repatriate profits.
So, the Sirleaf regime has emerged as a reliable advocate for the expansion of
American imperialism on the African Continent.
Beyond War Termination and Stabilisation: The Imperative of Rethinking
US–Liberia Relations
There is no doubt that the United States played a pivotal role in helping to
terminate the second Liberian civil war, and to subsequently stabilise the country.
Although these efforts are commendable, they however only addressed the
consequences or effects of the underlying civil conflict that occasioned Libe-
ria’s two civil wars. Hence, in order for the American efforts to contribute to the
construction of durable peace and the building of a new democratic and pros-
perous Liberia, it is imperative that US–Liberia relations be rethought. Overall,
the overarching framework in which the bilateral relations are conducted needs
to be changed. That is, the realpolitik model, which casts Liberia and other
developing countries simply as objects of American foreign policy to be ex-
ploited for the benefits of the United States, needs to be rethought. This is
because the resultant ‘realist trap’ would make it difficult for the United States
to support the democratic reconstitution of the Liberian state, the generator of
the crises of underdevelopment that led to the country’s two civil wars. In-
stead, the United States would continue to support any regime in Liberia,
irrespective of whether it is authoritarian or otherwise, on the basis of the
latter’s support for American national interests.
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     Such a myopic realist calculation would make the United States to con-
tinue to ignore critical problems such as human deprivation, ruling class-led
pillage and plunder, political corruption, the lack of transparency, and the lack
of accountability in Liberia. Over time, these problems could generate crises
that could again lead to a violent conflict. Thus, in order to forestall such an
outcome, the United States needs to use a new framework based on an equi-
table partnership with Liberia that advances political rights, civil liberties, ac-
countability, transparency, the rule of law, serious efforts to combat political
corruption, and policies that seek to address basic human social and economic
needs such as jobs, education and health care in the latter.
     Drawing from the new framework, the relations need to be anchored on
several core pillars. First, the United States needs to encourage the Sirleaf
regime to democratically reconstitute the Liberian state. This is the principal
precondition for setting into motion the process of addressing the civil conflict
that undergirded Liberia’s two civil wars. Clearly, the state that was estab-
lished in 1847, and subsequently transformed from a settler to a neo-colonial
construct in 1926 is of the wrong type. This is because as the repository of
evidence shows, this state construct has been anti-people, anti-democracy
and anti-development. For example, the various regimes have asphyxiated
political human rights (Freedom House 2010). On the social and economic
fronts, the subalterns have lived in a state of abject poverty, deprivation and
destitution (United Nations Development Programme 2006).
Additionally, the nature of the Liberian state does not reflect the historical
and cultural experiences of the amalgam of Liberia’s various ethnic groups.
Since the Liberian state was primarily established to help ‘resolve the race
problem in the United States’(Smith 1972; Beyan 1991; Kieh 2008), the
vision and national symbols, such as the national emblem, the motto and the
flag reflect the experiences of the freed Black slaves, who were repatriated to
Liberia beginning in 1820 (Dunn and Tarr 1988; Kieh 2008). In order for
durable peace to be established, the vision and national symbols need to be
changed, so that they can represent the collective historical-cultural experi-
ences of Liberia’s various indigenous ethnic groups, the repatriated Africans,
as well as immigrants from other African countries, and the Caribbean.
Historically, the state’s mission has been to create propitious conditions for
the prosecution of the profit-seeking agenda of multinational corporations,
and the predatory accumulation process of the members of the local Liberian
ruling class (Mayson and Sawyer 1979). This has exposed the ‘Janus-faced’
complexion of the neo-colonial Liberian state: on the one hand, the Liberian
state has created the conditions for the members of the local wings of the
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ruling class and their relations to have their basic human needs, including jobs,
education, health care, housing and food. However, on the other hand, the
Liberian state has visited deprivation on the subalterns (Kieh 2007; Kieh 2008).
Similarly, by its character, the Liberian state is, among other things,
exclusionary, predatory, criminalised, privatised, prebendal, exploitative, and
non-hegemonic. Hence, it is controlled by the particular faction or fraction of
the Liberian ruling class that has control of state power. Alternatively, Liberia
needs a new democratic state type that is based on holistic democracy –
cultural, economic, political and social. By this I mean the establishment of a
comprehensive form of democracy that transcends political-centric nature of
liberal democracy. To paraphrase Ake (1996), holistic democracy entails a
‘real democracy’ in which ordinary people have real decision-making powers,
and the thrust is on the welfare of the people, and the associated investment
in jobs, education, public health care, food security, public housing and public
transportation. Such a construct would be inclusive and will serve the interests
of all Liberians. It is critical to note that an exclusive focus on political restruc-
turing would be inadequate, given the nature of the civil conflict that under-
pinned Liberia’s two civil wars.
 The other major issue is that American policy toward Liberia needs to
transcend regimes or the so-called ‘big man’ or now ‘big woman’. This is
because such an approach in the past has made the United States to ‘look
away’ as incumbent Liberian regimes violated political rights and civil liberties,
and neglected the basic human needs of the members of the subaltern classes.
Accordingly, a new approach is needed that emphasises the promotion of
democratisation in concrete ways not simply by rhetoric. In other words, the
United States must make the support for democratic principles a cornerstone
of its new relationship with Liberia. The major advantage of such an approach
is that it would help to cage the ‘authoritarian demon’ that has perennially
terrorised Liberia, by promoting the institutionalisation of both procedural (po-
litical) and substantive democratisation (basic human needs, social justice,
equitable power relationships, etc.).
     Furthermore, the United States needs to support the rights of Liberian
workers to receive decent pay and humane working and living conditions, and
to use its influence in encouraging the Liberian government and Western and
Japanese multinational corporations such as Firestone to do likewise, and to
balance the need to get returns on their investments with the imperative of
making concrete and meaningful contributions to the reconstruction of Liberia.
Such an approach is exigent, because the history of private investment in
Liberia is replete with evidences of collusion between the Liberian government
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and Western multinational corporations with the acquiescence of the United
States government in the exploitation of Liberian workers and the country as a
whole. Clearly, the transformation of the dynamics of private foreign invest-
ment in Liberia would help to provide the financial resources that are exigent
for reconstructing Liberia.
As well, the United States needs to tailor its foreign aid to Liberia to the
critical areas of education, health care, and the rebuilding of the infrastructure
– schools, hospitals, clinics, roads, bridges, electricity, running water, etc.
Given the current pervasiveness of political corruption in Liberia (Frontpage
Africa 2010), the American government should devise modalities for ensuring
that the Liberian government spends American aid on human needs projects.
One of the major contingent modalities that could be used by the American
government is the contracting of projects directly to private companies. This
would help circumvent the constraints that are imposed by political corruption.
Conclusion
The article has attempted to examine the role of the Bush administration in
the termination of the second Liberian civil war, and the subsequent stabilisation
of the country. Clearly, the evidence shows that the United States played a
pivotal role in the twin processes of war termination and stabilisation. For
example, the exertion of pressure by the Bush administration on President
Taylor to resign as part of the process of ending the war helped to remove a
major obstacle. Similarly, the support provided by the Bush administration to
ECOMIL, the peacekeeping force of ECOWAS, in the areas of troop prepara-
tion, troop transportation, intelligence collection, equipment and logistics was
critical to stabilising Liberia. In turn, the termination of the war and the subse-
quent stabilisation of the country produced several dividends, including the
delivery of humanitarian assistance to civilians, the brokering of a peace agree-
ment, the deployment of the UN peacekeeping force, the establishment of a
transitional government, the holding of the 2005 national presidential and
legislative elections, and the creation of an enabling environment for setting
into motion the arduous process of post-conflict peacebuilding.
However, the study argues that the United States needs to transcend its
role in the termination of the civil war and stabilisation by rethinking the frame-
work that provides the tapestry for the conduct of its relations with Liberia.
Overall, this would require the changing of the realpolitik Weltanschauung. As
the derivatives, the United States needs to build an equitable partnership with
Liberia that is based on the support for the democratic reconstitution of the
Liberian state, the support for democratic principles over a regime or a ‘big
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man’ or ‘big woman’, the transformation of the nature and dynamics of private
foreign investment by Western multinational corporations, and tailoring its for-
eign aid to Liberia to human needs-based projects, and the reconstruction of
the infrastructure. If these can be done, the United States would then be
making a lasting contribution to the building of durable peace in Liberia based
on ‘real democracy’ (Ake 1996).
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